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21 
NOTE 
WITH FEDERAL MONEY UP FOR GRABS 
AND THE CLEAN ENERGY DREAM WITHIN 
REACH, THE NINTH CIRCUIT RUBBER 
STAMPS THE CENTRAL DISTRICT’S 
FLAWED JUDGMENT IN WESTERN 
WATERSHED PROJECT V. SALAZAR: SHOULD 
NEPA JURISPRUDENCE BE MODIFIED? 
ERIK FAUSSNER∗ 
“Conservation means development as much as it does protection.  I 
recognize the right and duty of this generation to develop and use 
the natural resources of our land; but I do not recognize the right to 
waste them, or to rob, by wasteful use, the generations that come 
after us.”1—Theodore Roosevelt 
INTRODUCTION 
Gifford Pinchot is said to have coined the term “conservation” at the 
turn of the twentieth century.2  As famous for his friendship with 
President Roosevelt as he was for his seminal book “The Fight for 
Conservation,” Pinchot fundamentally shaped the role government plays 
in protecting the natural environment.  In his book, Pinchot laid out the 
 
∗ J.D. Candidate 2015, Golden Gate University School of Law.   
 1 Theodore Roosevelt, The New Nationalism, (Aug. 31, 1910), available at 
PRESIDENTIALRHETORIC.COM, 
www.presidentialrhetoric.com/historicspeeches/roosevelt_theodore/newnationalism.html. 
 2 Brian Manetta, John Muir, Gifford Pinchot, and the Battle for Hetch Hetchy, ITHACA C.  
HIST. J. (2002), www.ithaca.edu/history/journal/papers/sp02muirpinchothetchy.html (last visited Jul. 
25, 2014).   
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three principles of conservation: (1) development; (2) the prevention of 
waste; and (3) ensuring that the use of natural resources is for the benefit 
of the many, not the profit of the few.3  He recognized that the source of 
the United States’ success related directly to the great wealth of its 
natural resources.4  Ensuring that these resources are used wisely, he 
believed, is the key to prosperity for generations to come.5 
Since Pinchot’s death in 1946,6 a lot has changed.  The United 
States has advanced a great deal, and the fight to protect the natural 
environment has extended globally to face the threat of climate change.  
One thing has remained the same, however: the fight over 
development—where to do it, how to regulate it, and what to protect. 
Clean-energy development, and more specifically solar-energy 
development, has been a hot issue in the early years of the twenty-first 
century.7  Developers are rushing to build large-scale solar- and wind-
energy projects in the Southwest,8 to meet public demand to curb climate 
change and to protect the natural environment from its ill effects.  But 
many of these projects are being developed in environmentally sensitive 
areas, raising issues much the same as in Pinchot’s time.9  What is 
different now is that there are rules and regulations designed to control 
this development.  Rules and regulations have to be enforced, though, 
and with political pressure being applied to regulatory bodies in order to 
make room for clean energy development, sometimes the principles laid 
out by Pinchot get side-stepped. 
As a clean-energy leader, California has been rapidly developing 
clean-energy infrastructure to meet its goal of supplying 33% of its 
electricity from renewable sources by 2020.10  The federal government 
has also been an active participant in this push for a clean-energy future, 
creating an atmosphere where big projects can thrive on federal land with 
 
 3 GIFFORD PINCHOT, THE FIGHT FOR CONSERVATION ch. V (1910), available at 
www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH7.   
 4 Id. ch. I, available at www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH3. 
 5 Id. ch. V, available at www.gutenberg.org/files/11238/11238-h/11238-h.htm#2HCH7. 
 6 Gifford Pinchot (1865–1946), THE FOREST HISTORY SOCIETY (Aug. 25, 2014), 
www.foresthistory.org/ASPNET/people/Pinchot/Pinchot.aspx.   
 7 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE HISTORY OF SOLAR, available at 
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/solar_timeline.pdf (last visited Mar.  3, 2014). 
 8 Todd Woody, A Solar Land Rush, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2009, 7:47 AM), 
http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/13/a-solar-land-rush/?_r=1. 
 9 See generally John Copeland Nagle, Green Harms of Green Projects, 27 NOTRE DAME 
J.L.  ETHICS & PUB.  POL’Y 59 (2013). 
 10 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-14-08 (Nov. 17, 2008), available at 
http://gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=11072.   
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help from the federal purse.11  With support from the state and federal 
governments, large-scale clean-energy projects will become 
commonplace in the California desert.12  The Southwest is an ideal place 
for solar development because of its reliably sunny weather.13  
Unfortunately, the rapid expansion of clean-energy infrastructure has 
begun to pit clean-energy proponents squarely against conservationists, 
turning traditional environmental allies against one another.14  These 
different groups within the “green” movement have competing visions of 
how to build the clean-energy future, and this policy disagreement leaves 
vulnerable the Southwest’s limited natural resources and threatened 
species.15 
In Western Watersheds Project v. Salazar, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to weigh in on the 
clean-energy expansion policy battle.16  Western Watersheds Project 
(WWP), a nonprofit conservation group, filed a lawsuit in the U.S.  
District Court for the Central District of California, alleging that the 
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) had violated the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by preparing a deficient 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) in order to approve a large-scale 
solar energy project.17  WWP requested that the district court 
preliminarily and permanently enjoin BLM from taking actions to further 
the project that could alter or change the physical environment, until it 
complied with NEPA and its implementing regulations.18  The district 
court denied WWP’s request for preliminary injunctive relief.19  On 
WWP’s appeal, the Ninth Circuit issued a three-paragraph decision, 
 
 11 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, Secretary Salazar, Senator Reid Announce “Fast-
Track” Initiatives for Solar Energy Development on Western Lands (June 29, 2009), available at 
www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/2009_06_29_release.cfm; see also Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008, 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014).   
 12 See Woody, supra note 8. 
 13 Ina Jaffe, A Renewable Energy Debate Heats Up in the Mojave, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO 
(Apr. 23, 2010, 12:01 AM), www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126173547 (explaining 
that the Mojave gets 360 days of sun each year on average). 
 14 Keith Matheny, Solar Energy Plans Pit Green vs. Green, USA TODAY (June 2, 2011, 1:18 
PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/environment/2011-06-01-solar-energy-
tortoise_n.htm. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See generally Nagle, supra note 9. 
 17 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–2, W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 
993 F. Supp. 2d 1126 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex)), available at 
www.westernwatersheds.org/legal/11/california/IvanpahComplaint_1-12-11.pdf.   
 18 Id.   
 19 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *72 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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conclusory in its remarks and cursory in its review of the complex issues 
involved, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
making its decision.20 
This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit erred in deciding Western 
Watersheds Project v. Salazar by not finding that the district court 
abused its discretion in denying WWP’s request for a preliminary 
injunction. 
Preliminary injunctions have been environmental nonprofit 
organizations’ most effective tool to enforce NEPA.21  Without the 
ability to stop projects from proceeding before adequate environmental 
review and analysis have occurred, these organizations have no way to 
prevent environmental destruction between the time they file a lawsuit 
and its final adjudication.  If courts fail to recognize legitimate EIS 
deficiencies and instead defer to biased agency opinions influenced by 
government policy pressures, then NEPA will have lost its effectiveness 
in ensuring agencies and the public are making fully informed decisions 
before moving forward with large-scale project proposals.  The decision 
in this case will have a detrimental effect on threatened species and 
sensitive ecosystems as more large-scale clean-energy projects are built 
in the deserts of the Southwest.  The district court’s decision to deny a 
preliminary injunction, despite facts presented by WWP indicating BLM 
violated NEPA, was an abuse of the court’s discretion that could set a 
bad precedent for future litigation. 
The Ninth Circuit has described abuse of discretion as “a plain 
error, discretion exercised to an end not justified by the evidence, a 
judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as are 
found.”22  The present case fits clearly into this description, but the 
ultimate ruling fails to adhere to the appellate court’s precedent.  The 
basis for the court’s decision is rooted in its conclusion that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in its application of the four-factor test 
set forth in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.23  The 
Winter formulation is the authoritative test federal courts use to grant 
preliminary injunctions.24  According to Winter, a preliminary injunction 
 
 20 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 21 Appeals Court Upholds Environmentalists’ Right to a Preliminary Injunction, ENV’T 
NEWS SERVICE (Jan. 27, 2011), www.ens-newswire.com/ens/jan2011/2011-01-27-092.html (quoting 
Susan Jane Brown, staff attorney for Western Environmental Law Center: “The preliminary 
injunction is a critical tool for environmentalists because it allows opponents of a project to stave off 
an imminent destructive project.”). 
 22 Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003).    
 23 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d at 922. 
 24 Winter v. Natural Res.  Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008); Sierra Forest Legacy v. 
Rey, 577 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).   
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may be granted if the plaintiff “establish[es] that he is likely to succeed 
on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of 
preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and 
that an injunction is in the public interest.”25  Also, in the Ninth Circuit, 
“‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a balance of hardships that 
tips sharply towards the plaintiff can support issuance of a preliminary 
injunction, so long as the plaintiff also shows that there is a likelihood of 
irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the public interest.”26  In 
this case, the record showed that the district court failed to correctly 
apply NEPA, which resulted in its misapplication of both of these 
preliminary-injunction tests. 
This Note will first discuss the threatened desert tortoise and the 
solar project that catalyzed the dispute.  Second, it will discuss the 
outside pressures put on BLM and the district court by the State of 
California and the federal government.  Third, a brief background of the 
case’s procedural history will be provided.  Fourth, this Note will dissect 
BLM’s most obvious violations of NEPA and the district court’s clear 
error in failing to recognize those violations.  Fifth, the Note will discuss 
how the district court clearly erred in its application of the Winter factors 
and the serious-questions test.  Sixth, it will show how the Ninth Circuit 
failed to apply its own standard in reviewing the district court’s decision 
for abuse of discretion.  And lastly, this Note will call for a bright-line 
exception for clean-energy projects that would give courts flexibility in 
regard to NEPA when disputes arise.  This flexibility would allow courts 
to approve clean-energy projects’ environmental reviews without setting 
bad precedents that can be used to justify other types of development 
projects. 
A. THE DESERT TORTOISE AND THE GIANT SOLAR FACILITY 
The central character in this story is the desert tortoise, gopherus 
agassizii, a creature unique to the Mojave Desert west of the Colorado 
River.27  This species of tortoise spends much of its life underground in 
burrows to protect itself from the extreme high and low temperatures that 
occur in the desert.28  Individuals live roughly thirty to fifty years, but 
 
 25 Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; Sierra Forest Legacy, 577 F.3d at 1021. 
 26 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011) (holding 
that Ninth Circuit’s “serious questions” test survives Winter).   
 27 See generally Mike Jones, Gopherus agassizii (California) Desert Tortoise, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LIFE (Cooper, 1863), available at http://eol.org/pages/456478/details. 
 28 MARK C. GROVER & LESLEY A. DEFALCO, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRICULTURE, FOREST 
SERVICE, INTERMOUNTAIN RESEARCH STATION, DESERT TORTOISE (GOPHERUS AGASSIZII): 
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few reach maturity due to the species’ extremely low reproductive rate 
(only 2%–5% of hatchlings become adults).29  Unfortunately, California 
populations of the desert tortoise are estimated to have declined by 90% 
since 1940, with their habitat being reduced by 50–60% since the 
1920s.30  These losses are mostly due to urbanization, agricultural 
development, livestock and feral burro grazing, and mortality on roads.31 
Because of the species’ dramatic decline and sensitivity, it was 
listed in 1990 as “threatened” under the Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).32  Now the tortoise must face one more threat, the rapid 
encroachment of solar- and wind-energy-generating facilities on its 
habitat. 
The facility encroaching on the tortoise’s habitat in the present case 
is BrightSource Energy’s Ivanpah Solar Electric Generation System 
(ISEGS or “Project”).33  The Project is the largest concentrated solar 
energy facility in the United States, consisting of three 459-foot towers 
with solar receivers on top and over 300,000 software-controlled mirrors 
on the ground surrounding them.34  The mirrors work together by 
tracking the sun in three dimensions to reflect the sunlight to the 
receivers on top of the towers.35  The sunlight hitting the solar receivers 
creates superheated steam, which is piped down to a conventional turbine 
to create electricity.36  The facility produces over 370 megawatts of 
power, enough to run 140,000 homes.37 
This pinnacle of human ingenuity is a central player in the clean-
energy future, but it requires a lot of space and sunlight to operate.  The 
Project site is on federal land in the Ivanpah Valley, encompassing 5.4 
 
STATUS-OF-KNOWLEDGE OUTLINE WITH REFERENCES, GEN. TECH. REP. INT-GTR-316, at 41-45 
(July 1995). 
 29 Id. 
 30 NATURESERVE, DRAFT REGIONAL ASSESSMENT: STATELINE SOLAR FARM PROJECT 23 
(2012) (citing KRISTIN H.  BERRY, THE DISTRIBUTION AND ABUNDANCE OF DESERT TORTOISES IN 
CALIFORNIA FROM THE 1920S TO THE 1960S AND A COMPARISON WITH THE CURRENT SITUATION 
118–153 (1984)).    
 31 DESERT TORTOISE RECOVERY OFFICE, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MOJAVE 
POPULATION OF THE DESERT TORTOISE (GOPHERUS AGASSIZII) 5-YEAR REVIEW: SUMMARY AND 
EVALUATION 22–44 (2010), available at 
http://ecos.fws.gov/docs/five_year_review/doc3572.DT%205Year%20Review_FINAL.pdf. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Ivanpah Project Facts, IVANPAH, http://ivanpahsolar.com/about (last visited July 29, 
2014). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
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square miles of premium desert-tortoise habitat.38  This may seem like an 
insignificant slice of the American Southwest, but it is only a small part 
of the 4,536 square miles of desert-tortoise habitat energy companies 
have requested from the BLM to build large-scale solar and wind 
projects in California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, and Utah to 
date.39 
WWP’s challenge to the Project focused on its large footprint, 
which would destroy the tortoise’s habitat, and BLM’s deficient EIS, 
which failed to adequately analyze the extent of the impact and 
alternatives that could virtually eliminate any adverse impact.40  WWP’s 
push for a preliminary injunction, however, would meet the full force of 
a political establishment set on building the clean-energy future a new 
administration had promised.41 
B. POLITICAL CAPITAL 
At the time ISEGS was being considered, both the state and federal 
governments had initiated the aggressive promotion of clean-energy 
development.42  On June 29, 2009, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar 
announced the “Fast-Track” initiative for solar-energy development on 
western lands.43  An integral part of the initiative was to increase the 
speed of the review of industry proposals and their environmental 
impacts (environmental impact statements, or EISs).44  At that time, the 
federal government also had in effect two programs designed to 
incentivize private companies to invest in clean-energy development: a 
tax-credit program and a loan-guarantee program, set to expire in 2010 
and 2011, respectively.45 
The tax-credit program, entitled the Energy Improvement and 
Extension Act of 2008, gave clean energy projects, like ISEGS, a 30% 
 
 38 Id. 
 39 Woody, supra note 8. 
 40 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 1-2. 
 41 BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW ENERGY FOR AMERICA, available at 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/media/Obama_New_Energy_0804.pdf (“The Obama-Biden 
comprehensive New Energy for America plan will . . . [e]nsure 10 percent of our electricity comes 
from renewable sources by, 2012, and 25 percent by 2025.”). 
 42 Cal. Exec. Order No. S-14-08, supra note 10; BARACK OBAMA AND JOE BIDEN: NEW 
ENERGY FOR AMERICA, supra note 41. 
 43 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 11. 
 44 Id. 
 45 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014); 10 C.F.R.  pt. 609 (Westlaw 2014) (loan guarantees 
for projects that employ innovative technologies). 
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tax credit provided they were underway before the end of 2010.46  The 
loan-guarantee program was an update to Title XVII of the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005, permitting the Secretary of Energy to make loan 
guarantees for projects that “avoid, reduce, or sequester air pollutants or 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases; and employ new or 
significantly improved technologies as compared to commercial 
technologies in service in the United States at the time the guarantee is 
issued.”47  These two programs, in conjunction with the Department of 
the Interior’s “Fast-Track” initiative, incentivized BLM to accelerate its 
review of the Project’s EIS analysis to make sure it was approved in time 
to receive the tax credit (estimated at $660 million with a Project cost of 
$2.2 billion) as well as a $1.375 billion loan guarantee.48 
California was also insistent that clean-energy projects be built 
rapidly within its borders.  Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed 
Assembly Bill 32, the Global Warming Solutions Act, in 2006.49  This 
law gave the Air Resources Board authority to find ways to rapidly 
reduce California’s carbon emissions by one third by 2020.50  The 
incentives created by Assembly Bill 32 made California a helpful partner 
for the federal government when the Obama Administration took the 
helm in 2009 with hopes to act on the clean-energy portion of its 
campaign platform.51 
The clean-energy policy initiatives being pushed by the federal 
government and California created an environment in which BLM felt 
comfortable resisting any delay in the Project’s approval process, 
allowing NEPA deficiencies to be swept under the rug even when the 
public brought them to BLM’s attention.52  WWP and other conservation 
organizations repeatedly presented their concerns about the Project’s 
shortcomings to BLM.  WWP submitted comments to the draft EIS 
explaining that it failed NEPA’s “hard look” requirement because it did 
not consider or analyze a location on the Ivanpah Dry Lake bed that 
 
 46 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014). 
 47 74 Fed. Reg. 63,544, 63,549 (Dec.  4, 2009); see also, 10 C.F.R. §§ 609.1-609.18 
 48 Matheny, supra note 14. 
 49 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
38500 et seq. (Westlaw 2014). 
 50 California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 
38550 (West 2007). 
 51 Mary D. Nichols, First 100 Days: Obama’s First Climate Change Target, REUTERS (Jan. 
22, 2009), http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/22/first-100-days-obamas-first-climate-
change-target/. 
 52 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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would have allowed the Project to be built with virtually zero impact on 
the desert tortoise, rare plants, and other scarce resources.53  BLM 
dismissed WWP’s concerns. 
Despite a multitude of serious deficiencies identified by WWP, in 
the end the district court failed to acknowledge the merits of WWP’s 
claims.54  Instead, the court deferred to BLM’s assurances and an amicus 
curiae brief submitted by Governor Edmund G.  Brown Jr.  of California, 
denying the preliminary injunction requested by WWP.55  This denial 
allowed the Project to move forward with construction, past the 
proverbial “point of no return.”  WWP exercised its only option by 
appealing the decision to the Ninth Circuit.56  The appeal would not be 
heard for nearly a year, allowing the Project to destroy the habitat WWP 
sought to protect.57 
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
On November 6, 2007, the Bureau of Land Management published 
notice of its intent to prepare a draft EIS and a final staff assessment to 
amend the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA) plan to 
accommodate the construction of the Ivanpah Solar Electric Generating 
System.58  The draft EIS was published on November 4, 2009, which 
opened a review period for public comments that closed on February 11, 
2010.59  WWP timely submitted comments to BLM explaining that the 
Project would “have significant direct, indirect and cumulative impacts 
on desert tortoises, rare plants and visual resources.”60  WWP also 
highlighted BLM’s failure to adequately consider alternatives to the 
Project and sufficiently document the Project’s impacts.61  After the 
initial EIS, BLM obtained a biological opinion from the U.S.  Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) that outlined the impact on the flora and fauna, 
 
 53 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 54 See generally Id. 
 55 Id. at *71-2  
 56 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 57 Id. 
 58 Notice of Intent to Prepare a Joint Environmental Impact Statement and Final Staff 
Assessment, and Amend the California Desert Conservation Area Plan; California, 72 Fed. Reg.  
2,671 (Nov. 6, 2007). 
 59 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *9-10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. 
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most importantly the desert tortoise, of the proposed project site.62  The 
biological opinion described the measures that should be taken to limit 
the detrimental effects on the tortoise and set an incidental take limit63 to 
restrict the number of tortoises that could be removed from the site 
without further investigation.64 
On August 6, 2010, BLM published the proposed Final 
Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) and opened a thirty-day public-
comment period.65  The concerns WWP raised were not addressed.  
WWP again protested the proposed FEIS with timely comments on 
September 3, 2010, explaining that the EIS was still unlawful under 
NEPA because it did not consider adequately a location on the Ivanpah 
Dry Lake bed that would have allowed the Project to be built without 
detrimental impacts on the environment.66  Ignoring WWP’s comments 
again, BLM issued a record of decision approving the proposal to amend 
the CDCA Plan to include the ISEGS facility and grant the 
authorizations necessary for the Project to begin pre-construction in 
October 2010.67 
In response, on January 14, 2011, WWP filed a complaint in the 
U.S.  District Court for the Central District of California for declaratory 
and injunctive relief, requesting that the court “[p]reliminarily and 
permanently enjoin all defendants from initiating any activities in 
furtherance of the Project that could result in any change or alteration of 
the physical environment unless and until defendants comply with the 
 
 62 See generally Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ventura Fish & Wildlife Office, 
Ventura, Cal., to Dist. Manager, Cal. Desert Dist., Bureau of Land Mgmt., Moreno Valley, Cal. (Oct.  
1, 2010), available at 
http://docketpublic.energy.ca.gov/PublicDocuments/Regulatory/Non%20Active%20AFC’s/07-AFC-
5%20Ivanpah%20Solar%20Electric/2010/October/TN%2058750%2010-01-
10%20USFWS’%20Biological%20Opinion%20on%20ISEGS.pdf [hereinafter Memorandum from 
Field Supervisor, Ventura].   
 63 An incidental take limit is defined in the incidental take statement (ITS) of a biological 
opinion.  It “expresses the amount or extent of anticipated take of listed animal species caused by the 
proposed action, along with reasonable and prudent measures to minimize the impact of take and 
terms and conditions for which there must be compliance. . . .  If the federal action proceeds and the 
take of threatened or endangered species exceeds the level or extent exempted under the ITS, or if 
the scope of the project changes, the federal agency must reinitiate its consultation with the 
Services.” U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., ESA REGULATORY REFORM: PROPOSED RULE GOVERNING 
INCIDENTAL TAKE STATEMENTS; QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS, available at 
www.fws.gov/endangered/improving_ESA/pdf/ITS_FAQs.pdf (last visited July 29, 2014). 
 64 Memorandum from Field Supervisor, Ventura, supra note 62, at 57. 
 65 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. at *9. 
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requirements of NEPA, ESA, .  .  .  and their implementing 
regulations.”68  Despite the serious concerns raised in the lawsuit filed by 
WWP, on March 2, 2011, BLM issued two notices to proceed with 
ISEGS construction.69  Shortly after perimeter fencing had started, on 
April 15, 2011, BLM had to issue a suspension decision to halt work, 
because the construction process had found more desert tortoises than 
allowed by the incidental-take limit set by the FWS’s biological 
opinion.70  Multiple tortoises had been killed,71 which was a problem that 
WWP had warned of in its EIS comments. 
After consulting with FWS, on June 10, 2011, BLM determined that 
the underestimate of the tortoise population was not an issue.72  It 
decided that the new information did not significantly change the NEPA 
analysis and that further public involvement to comment and review the 
new and improved biological opinion and tortoise mitigation plan was 
not necessary.73  That same day BLM gave the green light for 
construction to resume.74 
As a last resort, WWP filed a Motion for Preliminary Injunction and 
Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on June 27, to halt 
the Project from further destroying tortoise habitat until a new NEPA 
review had been done.75  The District Court denied the TRO three days 
later and set the matter for hearing on August 1 to determine the 
preliminary injunction matter.76  On July 19, Governor Edmund G.  
Brown Jr.  filed an amicus brief in opposition to the preliminary 
injunction.77  After the August 1 hearing, on August 10 the district court 
entered an order denying the request for a preliminary injunction.78  
WWP appealed the decision. 
 
 68 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 24. 
 69 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 70 Id. at *11. 
 71 Julie Cart, Saving Desert Tortoises Is a Costly Hurdle for Solar Projects, L.A. TIMES 
(Mar. 4, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/04/local/la-me-solar-tortoise-20120304. 
 72 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. at *3. 
 75 Id. at *3. 
 76 Id.   
 77 Id.   
 78 Id. at *72. 
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On August 8, 2012, the matter was finally argued before the Ninth 
Circuit.79  The Court affirmed the decision of the district court, finding 
that there was no clear factual error or mistake of law in the lower court’s 
analysis.80 
II. ANALYSIS 
To facilitate a better understanding of the issues presented, this Part 
will give a brief overview of the NEPA issues involved in this lawsuit, 
concentrating specifically on portions of the law that are relevant to 
illustrate shortfalls in both the district court’s and the Ninth Circuit’s 
analysis.  It will then go into detail to describe the mistakes of law in the 
district court’s analysis of WWP’s NEPA claims.  Then, this Part will 
discuss how those mistakes of law led the district court to erroneously 
apply the accepted preliminary-injunction tests and why that should have 
compelled the Ninth Circuit to find that the district court abused its 
discretion. 
A. NEPA VIOLATIONS 
President Richard Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy 
Act into law on January 1, 1970.81  NEPA’s central purpose is to give the 
public a clear basis of choice82 between development actions by 
requiring federal agencies to consider every significant environmental 
impact of a proposed action before proceeding.83  NEPA accomplishes 
this by informing the public about what the action is, by showing the 
public that the relevant agency has evaluated the environmental 
consequences of the proposed action, and by requiring analysis of a full 
range of alternatives to the proposed action before proceeding.84  
Considered a procedural statute, NEPA requires only that an agency fully 
comply with the mandates in the statute, not that NEPA review lead to 
any particular outcome.85 
NEPA requires an EIS to have an adequate discussion and analysis 
of a project’s direct and indirect environmental impacts, the impacts that 
 
 79 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 80 Id. 
 81 LINDA LUTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33152, THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY ACT: BACKGROUND AND IMPLEMENTATION 1 (2005). 
 82 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014); see also Watkins, 808 F. Supp. at 872. 
 83 LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1. 
 84 Id.; see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 766–67 (9th Cir. 1982); Citizens for a 
Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 85 LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1. 
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would occur if no action were taken, and alternatives to the proposed 
action.86  This framework is designed so that when an agency makes a 
decision on a project, it “will have available, and will carefully consider, 
detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts .  .  .  
[and make the information] available to the larger audience [the public] 
that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the 
implementation of that decision.”87 
In the present case, BLM’s most obvious violations of the NEPA 
process included its failure to fully inform the public of the likely 
environmental impacts of the Project and its failure to fully evaluate 
alternatives to the proposal before proceeding.88  These violations are 
illustrated by the EIS’s inadequate discussion of habitat fragmentation 
caused by the Project and its failure to adequately analyze the “Ivanpah 
Playa Alternative” to the Project, which would have essentially 
eliminated impacts on the desert tortoise. 
Either of these NEPA violations should have rendered the EIS 
inadequate.89  However, the district court failed to grant a preliminary 
injunction based on the deficient EIS.  An injunction in this case would 
have been warranted because it would not have significantly harmed 
BLM or BrightSource Energy, it would have given BLM time to cure the 
NEPA violations, and most importantly, it would have provided “a clear 
basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker and the public,” 
which is the central purpose of NEPA.90  The district court abused its 
discretion by not issuing the injunction despite evidence of NEPA 
violations, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the logic and effect of 
the facts as [were] found.”91 
1. Inadequate Discussion of Habitat Fragmentation 
For an EIS to be lawful under NEPA, it must adequately discuss all 
direct and indirect environmental impacts caused by an action that are 
reasonably foreseeable.92 
 
 86 Id. 
 87 Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). 
 88 See Se. Alaska Conservation Council v. Fed. Highway Admin., 649 F.3d 1050, 1059 (9th 
Cir. 2011). 
 89 See generally Block, 690 F.2d 753; see also Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy v. U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation, 655 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 90 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added). 
 91 Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 92 Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy, 655 F.3d at 1011. 
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In this case, one reasonably foreseeable impact caused by the 
Project was habitat fragmentation.  Habitat fragmentation is the reduction 
and isolation of the natural environment from a large patch to smaller 
isolated patches, typically leading to negative outcomes in sensitive 
ecosystems.93  The large footprint of the Project fragments the habitat of 
the desert tortoise, inhibiting its movement and degrading its adjacent 
habitat.94  This fragmentation “directly and adversely affect[s] habitat for 
a threatened species.”95 
Due to the fragmentation’s direct and indirect adverse impact on the 
desert tortoise, it should have been discussed fully in the EIS.  A full 
discussion and analysis of probable environmental impacts is 
characterized as a “hard look.”96  An adequate “hard look” in this case 
would have included discussion of the type of fragmentation caused by 
the Project and analysis of the impact the fragmentation would have on 
the desert tortoise and other species.97  The discussion and analysis has to 
be scientifically sound, including explanations of the methodologies used 
(to make sure they are generally accepted), and the conclusions must be 
based upon the scientific findings of the study.98 
BLM’s EIS lacked all of these elements in its discussion of habitat 
fragmentation.  Instead, the EIS provided only general statements about 
possible effects and risks to the tortoise.99  There was nothing in the way 
of scientific analysis describing how bad the fragmentation would be, or 
 
 93 Alan B. Franklin, Barry R. Noon & T. Luke George, What Is Habitat Fragmentation?, 25 
STUDIES IN AVIAN BIOLOGY 20 (2002), available at 
www.fws.gov/southwest/es/documents/R2ES/LitCited/LPC_2012/Franklin_et_al_2002.pdf. 
 94 Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 13, W. Watersheds Project v. 
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011), available at 
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf. 
 95 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 96 Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 97 Marble Mountain Audubon Soc’y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
Forest Service did not take a ‘hard look’ at the impact of the selected salvage and harvest alternative 
on the Grider drainage biological corridor.  Although the FEIS acknowledges that the Grider 
drainage is a biological corridor, it does not contain a significant discussion of the corridor issue.  
Instead, the FEIS concludes, without any apparent study or supporting documentation, that the 
preservation of a ½-mile wide strip bisecting the drainage will be sufficient to maintain the 
corridor.”). 
 98 40 C.F.R. § 1502.24 (Westlaw 2014). 
 99 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, CALIFORNIA DESERT 
CONSERVATION AREA PLAN AMENDMENT/FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT FOR 
IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC GENERATING SYSTEM, FEIS-10-31, at 5-26 to -27 (July 31, 2010), 
available at www.blm.gov/pgdata/etc/medialib/blm/ca/pdf/needles/lands_solar.Par.19048.File.dat/1-
CDCA-Ivanpah-Final-EIS.pdf.    
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how exactly the fragmentation would effect the tortoise population.  
These sorts of generalized statements do not constitute a “hard look” as 
required by NEPA.100 
The district court recognized this shortcoming in the EIS.101  The 
court’s opinion went so far as to state that the deficiency “raise[d] a 
serious question as to whether BLM violated NEPA by engaging in a 
cursory discussion of habitat connectivity and fragmentation without 
analyzing the potential impacts . . . on the . . . desert tortoise.”102  In fact, 
the cursory discussion of indirect impacts of the Project was a violation 
of NEPA, and it had been a fatal flaw in previous cases.103 
In Marble Mountain Audubon Society v. Rice, the Ninth Circuit held 
that the U.S.  Forest Service (FS) failed the “hard look” requirement of 
NEPA because its EIS lacked discussion or reasoned analysis of the 
indirect impacts of a proposed project.104  The Northern District found 
similarly in 2004, holding that when adverse indirect effects of a project 
can be predicted, the agency must make their decision based on reasoned 
discussion and analysis in an EIS to be valid under NEPA.105 
Here the issue is much the same.  BLM’s EIS recognized that the 
Project would have adverse indirect impacts because of fragmentation,106 
but it failed to further discuss the fragmentation and its impacts after 
mentioning them.  Many questions went unanswered, violating the 
procedure and purpose designed into NEPA’s EIS requirement.  “[T]he 
purpose of the EIS requirement is to ensure that ‘to the fullest extent 
possible’ agency decisionmakers have before them and take into proper 
account a complete analysis of the project’s environmental impact.”107  
BLM’s failure to include any reasoned analysis of habitat fragmentation 
went squarely against the aforementioned EIS requirement, which is why 
the district court’s decision to overlook the NEPA deficiency was an 
abuse of discretion.108 
 
100 Or. Natural Res. Council v. Lowe, 109 F.3d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
101 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. (CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *23 (C.D. Cal. Aug.  10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
102 Id. at *24. 
103 Marble Mountain Audubon Soc’y v. Rice, 914 F.2d 179, 182 (9th Cir. 1990). 
104 Id. (finding that EIS’s lack of discussion about the indirect impact on a biological corridor 
was a violation of NEPA).   
105 Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Blackwell, 389 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
106 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 5-26 to -27 (“[The Project will] result in 
habitat fragmentation, which is exacerbated by the presence of the . . . I-15 [and other area projects] 
that effectively block the migration of terrestrial species from east to west.”).   
107 City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 673 (9th Cir. 1975). 
108 Rabkin v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 350 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) 
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The Ninth Circuit has stated that, “[w]here the information in the 
initial EIS was so incomplete or misleading that the decisionmaker and 
the public could not make an informed comparison of the alternatives, 
revision of an EIS may be necessary to provide a reasonable, good faith, 
and objective presentation of the subjects required by NEPA.”109  The 
absence of the habitat fragmentation analysis in BLM’s EIS made it 
impossible for BLM or the public to make an informed decision about 
the Project and its alternatives.  Every significant aspect of the direct and 
indirect impacts of a project must be included in the EIS or it is deficient, 
and the action should not move forward until the deficiency is cured.110  
The district court’s decision to dismiss WWP’s claim was an abuse of 
discretion, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the logic and effect of 
the facts as [were] found.”111  The court should have granted the 
requested preliminary injunction to give BLM time to remedy the 
habitat-fragmentation deficiencies before allowing the Project to move 
forward. 
2. Inadequate Discussion of the Ivanpah Playa Alternative 
NEPA also requires federal agencies to rigorously explore and 
evaluate reasonable alternatives to a proposed action in order to facilitate 
informed decisionmaking.112  The alternatives analysis has been 
described as the “heart” of the EIS.113  This section of the EIS is designed 
to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the 
alternatives in comparative form, thus sharply defining the issues and 
providing a clear basis for choice among options by the decisionmaker 
and the public.”114  The implementing regulations of NEPA state that 
reasonable alternatives “include[] alternatives that are technically and 
economically practical or feasible and meet the purpose and need of the 
proposed action.”115  They also specify that the range of alternatives 
“includes all reasonable alternatives, or when there are potentially a very 
large number of alternatives then a reasonable number of examples 
 
109 Natural Res. Def. Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 421 F.3d 797, 811 (9th Cir. 2005) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Animal Def. Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1439 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
110 Ctr. for Envtl. Law & Policy v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 655 F.3d 1000, 1011 (9th Cir. 
2011). 
111 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977. 
112 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (Westlaw 2014).   
113 City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997). 
114 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added). 
115 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(b) (Westlaw 2014) (implementation of National Environmental Policy 
Act of 1969). 
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covering the full spectrum of reasonable alternatives, each of which 
must be rigorously explored and objectively evaluated . . . .”116 
The purpose of rigorously evaluating a “full spectrum” of 
alternatives is to foster a clear basis for choice.117  Looking at alternatives 
that are at different sites is essential to an EIS because it helps 
decisionmakers and the public weigh options with vastly different levels 
of environmental impact.118  “The existence of a viable but unexamined 
alternative renders an environmental impact statement inadequate” and 
violates NEPA.119  The Project configuration that was analyzed in the 
EIS and eventually chosen for development was described in the final 
EIS as having “adverse environmental impacts to the biological 
resources of the Ivanpah Valley, affecting many sensitive plant and 
wildlife species and eliminating a broad expanse of relatively 
undisturbed Mojave Desert habitat.”120  The alternatives analyzed by 
BLM in its EIS did not satisfy NEPA’s requirement that the agency 
rigorously explore and evaluate a “full spectrum” of alternatives. 
The final ISEGS facility sits West of Highway I-15, in the middle of 
what was undisturbed Mojave Desert habitat.  Nearby Ivanpah Dry Lake 
is a site that could have been developed under the Ivanpah Play 
Alternative with virtually no adverse environmental impact on biological 
resources.  This alternative, however, was rejected by BLM without 
rigorous exploration or objective evaluation. 
In BLM’s EIS, out of twenty-five identified alternatives, most 
(including the Ivanpah Playa Alternative) were quickly dismissed.  Only 
three alternatives were chosen for detailed analysis: Mitigated Ivanpah 3, 
Modified I-15, and No Action.121  The Mitigated Ivanpah 3 Alternative 
would have been on the same site as the original proposed Project.122  
The main difference between this alternative and the problematic original 
proposal was that it would have had a 12.5% smaller footprint and a 
slightly different configuration.123  The Modified I-15 Alternative was 
also on the same site as the original proposed Project, but it would have 
reduced the footprint by the same 12.5% as Mitigated Ivanpah 3 in a 
slightly different way.124  These two alternatives, though technically 
 
116 Id. § 46.420(c) (emphasis added). 
117 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014). 
118 California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982). 
119 Citizens for a Better Henderson v. Hodel, 768 F.2d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1985).   
120 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 6-1.   
121 Id. at 3-5 to 3-6.    
122 Id. at 3-26.    
123 Id. at 3-27.   
124 Id. at 3-36 to 3-38.   
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different, would have done nothing except reduce by a small percentage 
the amount of desert tortoise habitat that would be destroyed by the 
Project through their smaller footprints and altered configurations. 
The No-Action Alternative that was analyzed in the EIS did not 
help fulfill the “full spectrum” of alternatives requirement either.  A No-
Action alternative is required procedurally by NEPA as a benchmark for 
the public and decisionmakers to compare the proposed action and its 
analyzed alternatives’ impacts to existing conditions without action.125  
This left just the Mitigated Ivanpah 3 and Modified I-15 alternatives to 
be objectively evaluated.  This fact is disturbing because the two 
proposed alternatives to the Project were, in fact, really not alternatives 
at all.  They were instead merely two different versions of the original 
proposed Project, creating an illusion of choice in an attempt to satisfy 
the alternatives analysis required under NEPA. 
What was clearly missing from BLM’s EIS was the required “full 
spectrum” of alternatives, including those on different sites with 
significantly less environmental impact.126  NEPA’s implementing 
regulations clearly call for alternatives from this spectrum to be 
“rigorously explored and objectively evaluated.”127  BLM’s EIS failed to 
analyze any true alternative to the Project, instead evaluating two 
“alternatives” that were all on the same site, with similar environmental 
impacts and with negligible differences between them.  These 
alternatives also failed to address important objectives of the Project, 
outlined by BLM in the Final Staff Assessment and Draft EIS.128 
Two of those important objectives are to “reduce environmental 
impacts” and “avoid siting the plant in areas that are highly pristine or 
biologically sensitive.”129  Unlike the two alternatives that were fully 
analyzed by BLM, siting the Project on the Ivanpah Dry Lake pursuant 
to the Ivanpah Playa Alternative would have met or exceeded both of 
those stated objectives along with five out of six other stated 
objectives.130  This close fit with the stated objectives of the Project 
 
125 DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION § 10:29 (2d ed. 2013) (“The no-
action alternative provides a baseline against which action alternatives are evaluated.”).   
126 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(c) (Westlaw 2014).   
127 Id.   
128 See generally U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT. & CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, FINAL STAFF 
ASSESSMENT/DRAFT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT IVANPAH SOLAR ELECTRIC 
GENERATING SYSTEM 07-AFC-5, at 2-5 to 2-6 (Nov. 4, 2009), available at 
www.energy.ca.gov/2008publications/CEC-700-2008-013/CEC-700-2008-013-FSA.PDF. 
129 Id. at 2-6.   
130 The only objective the siting alternative would not conform completely with is objective 
number six, which aims to have the use comply with existing BLM land use objectives.  The dry 
lake is used by up to 5,000 people annually for land sailing.  See id at 2-5 to 2-6. 
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should have made a fair and detailed analysis of the Ivanpah Playa 
Alternative an essential element of the EIS.131  The district court 
however, decided that was not the case.132 
In the EIS, BLM dedicated four short paragraphs to the Ivanpah 
Playa Alternative and eliminated the proposed site because it “would not 
be economically feasible, and would be inconsistent with current 
management objectives for non-motorized recreation on the Dry Lake 
bed.”133  This quick dismissal of the alternative, which would have 
eliminated virtually all environmental impacts on threatened tortoises, is 
puzzling.134  BLM cited the Lake Bed’s propensity to flood as the main 
barrier to the alternative, commenting that diking could be done to 
control flooding but that it would likely be economically infeasible.135  
This cursory discussion, followed by a conclusory dismissal of an 
alternative that avoided a great deal of environmental harm, violated 
NEPA.136  BLM’s dismissal also went against the Ninth Circuit’s 
instruction that agencies cannot dismiss alternatives that promote the 
public interest in preventing irreparable environmental injury because of 
possible economic barriers.137 
Here, if the district court had followed the logic of the appellate 
court’s precedent, it would have concluded that the public interest in 
avoiding the irreparable injury to the tortoise and 5.4 square miles of its 
habitat outweighed BrightSource Energy’s economic concerns.  In 
practice, the district court did quite the opposite, weighing heavily the 
private investments of BrightSource Energy138 without exploring any 
savings other alternatives could create.139 
 
131 California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767–68 (9th Cir. 1982).   
132 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No.  CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
133 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-81.   
134 Cf. Block, 690 F.2d at 767–68 (holding that U.S. Forest Service violated NEPA by not 
considering an adequate range of alternatives, and noting that the dismissal of an alternative that had 
a higher percentage of acreage allocated for wilderness use was “puzzling”).   
135 BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-81.   
136 Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (discussing 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S.  531 (1987)), overruled in part on other grounds by 
Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
137 Id. (“[T]he public interest in preserving nature and avoiding irreparable environmental 
injury outweighs economic concerns . . . .”).   
138 W.  Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *63 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
139 Strangely, the court didn’t even consider the cost savings the Ivanpah Playa Alternative 
could have created because of the low impact on threatened species and plants when weighing the 
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The court’s failure to consider BLM’s lack of discussion or analysis 
of the cost of diking the Playa in its EIS was tantamount to it burying its 
head in the sand to avoid recognizing the glaring NEPA deficiencies 
present in BLM’s EIS.  Without this analysis, it was impossible for BLM 
to “present the environmental impacts of the proposal and the 
alternatives in comparative form . . . providing a clear basis for choice 
among options by the decisionmaker and the public.”140  BLM’s failure 
to complete an adequate analysis of the most feasible site location with 
virtually no impact on threatened tortoises violated NEPA.141 
The district court again failed to recognize this.  It instead stated 
that the “rule of reason”142 used by BLM correctly determined that a 
lakebed prone to flooding was not consistent with operating an electrical 
generating facility and thus was not a reasonable alternative.143  
However, this was an erroneous use of the rule of reason.  The rule of 
reason is properly used to determine whether an EIS contains a thorough 
discussion of probable environmental consequences, adequate in “form, 
content and preparation foster[ing] . . . informed decision-making and 
informed public participation.”144  This rule operates to give agencies 
discretion not to explore every conceivable environmental impact, just 
those that are within reason.145  BLM’s cursory dismissal of the Ivanpah 
Playa Alternative, because of unexamined economic concerns and a 
minor divergence from current management objectives, was not a proper 
exercise of the agency’s discretion.  Conversely, it was an unlawful 
sidestepping of NEPA procedures, because it limited the range of 
alternatives to essentially three versions of the same project proposal.146  
 
economic concerns of BrightSource Energy.  In fact, as of 2012, the cost of mitigating damage to the 
tortoises on the Project site has cost $56 million.  See Cart, supra note 71. 
140 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14 (Westlaw 2014) (emphasis added). 
141 Sierra Club v. Watkins, 808 F. Supp. 852, 872 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that an EIS 
should rigorously explore and evaluate a full spectrum of reasonable alternatives to a proposed 
project); see also California v. Block, 690 F.2d 753, 767 (9th Cir. 1982).   
142 See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1150–51. 
143 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *55 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
144 City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1150–51 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
145 “[A]n EIS need not be exhaustive to the point of discussing all possible details bearing on 
the proposed action but will be upheld as adequate if it has been compiled in good faith and sets 
forth sufficient information to enable the decision-maker to consider fully the environmental factors 
involved and to make a reasoned decision after balancing the risks of harm to the environment 
against the benefits to be derived from the proposed action, as well as to make a reasoned choice 
between alternatives.” Cnty. of Suffolk v. Sec’y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1375 (2d Cir. 1977). 
146 The original proposed Project, the Mitigated Ivanpah 3 Alternative, and the Modified I-15 
Alternative.  BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., supra note 99, at 3-5 to 3-6.    
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This action was contrary to NEPA’s goal of fostering informed 
decisionmaking. 
The Ninth Circuit has held that failing to include an adequate range 
of alternatives is a violation of NEPA.147  In California v. Block, the State 
of California brought suit against the FS for failing to comply with 
NEPA by relying on an inadequate EIS to support its decision to allocate 
roadless National Forest System land (RARE II).148  RARE II required 
the FS to allocate over 62 million acres of National Forest System land 
for different uses, which the FS categorized in “Wilderness,” 
“NonWilderness,” or “Further Planning” designations.149  The State’s 
biggest concern with FS’s EIS was its unfair minimization of the 
environmental consequences of the Nonwilderness designation.150  The 
State argued, and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
California held in part, that NEPA had been violated because there was 
not an adequate range of alternatives analyzed in the EIS.151 
The district court took particular issue with the fact that the FS only 
included alternatives that allocated 33% or less of National Forest 
System land to the “Wilderness” designation.152  The court held that in 
order for the EIS to comply with NEPA, it needed to include an 
alternative that “[a]llocat[ed] to Wilderness a share of the RARE II 
acreage at an intermediate percentage between 34% and 100%.”153  On 
appeal by the FS, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding, 
calling the inclusion of alternatives with higher percentages allocated to 
Wilderness “essential to making a ‘reasoned choice.’”154  The court of 
appeals explained: 
The policy at hand demands a trade-off between wilderness use and 
development.  This trade-off, however, cannot be intelligently made 
without examining whether it can be softened or eliminated by 
increasing resource extraction and use from already developed areas.  
The economic value of nonwilderness use is a function of its scarcity.  
Benefits accrue from opening virgin land to nonwilderness use, but the 
benefits’ worth depend upon their relative availability elsewhere, and 
 
147 See generally Block, 690 F.2d 753. 
148 Id. 
149 See generally FOREST SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL STATEMENT: 
ROADLESS AREA REVIEW AND EVALUATION, (Jan. 1979), available at 
www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/stelprdb5116928.pdf. 
150 Block, 690 F.2d at 762. 
151 Id. at 766–67. 
152 Id. at 766. 
153 Id. 
154 Id. at 767–68. 
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the comparative environmental costs of focusing development in these 
other areas.155 
A similar issue resulted from BLM’s lack of analysis of the Ivanpah 
Playa Alternative.  The policy at hand was a trade-off between 
destroying 5.4 square miles of threatened species habitat, and developing 
the Project on a site that would not have had that sort of environmental 
impact.  The fact that an alternative existed by which the Project could be 
built without having such a high environmental cost required BLM to 
conduct a rigorous exploration of the alternative.  Without such analysis, 
BLM, like the FS in Block, could not make a “reasoned choice.”156  BLM 
was required to take a “hard look” at the Ivanpah Playa Alternative, and 
its failure to do so rendered its EIS inadequate, violating NEPA.  The 
district court’s decision to dismiss WWP’s request for injunctive relief 
was an abuse of discretion, “a judgment that [was] clearly against the 
logic and effect of the facts as [were] found.”157 
B. MISAPPLICATION OF WINTER AND SERIOUS-QUESTIONS TESTS 
With two stark violations of NEPA before the district court, it next 
had to apply the principles of one of the two accepted preliminary-
injunction tests to determine whether equitable relief should be granted 
to WWP.  The court’s mistake of law in analyzing WWP’s NEPA claims 
would lead to its misapplication of both of these tests. 
A preliminary injunction may be granted when the plaintiff 
establishes “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to 
suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the 
balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the 
public interest.”158  Injunctive relief should also be granted if a plaintiff 
raises serious questions going to the merits and the balance of hardships 
tips sharply in the plaintiff’s favor, so long as the plaintiff shows that 
there is a likelihood of irreparable injury and that the injunction is in the 
public interest.159  The Ninth Circuit applies a “sliding scale” when 
weighing the factors in these tests, allowing a strong showing on one 
factor to make up for a weaker showing in another, so long as the 
 
155 Id. at 767. 
156 Id. 
157 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977.   
158 Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).    
159 Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th Cir. 2011).   
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plaintiff shows a likelihood of irreparable injury and not just a possibility 
of such injury.160 
In the present case, the district court should have granted a 
preliminary injunction because WWP was likely to succeed on the 
merits, there were serious questions going to the merits of its claims, 
absent injunctive relief WWP would have suffered irreparable harm, the 
balance of the equities (if they had been properly analyzed) tipped in 
WWP’s favor, and an injunction would have been in the public interest.  
The four prongs of these tests may be combined into three categories: (1) 
success on the merits and serious questions; (2) irreparable harm; and (3) 
balance of the equities making a preliminary injunction in the public 
interest (combining balancing of equities with the public interest because 
the factors are interrelated). 
1. Success on the Merits and Serious Questions 
Regarding the determination whether a claim will succeed on the 
merits, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the standard for a 
preliminary injunction requires only “that the plaintiff . . . show a 
likelihood of success on the merits rather than actual success.”161  As was 
discussed in the previous section, WWP was likely to succeed on the 
merits of its NEPA-violation claims,162 satisfying the merits prong of 
Winter. 
As for satisfying the alternate “serious questions” merits prong of 
the test, the district court’s opinion stated outright that WWP “raise[d] a 
serious question as to whether BLM violated NEPA by engaging in a 
cursory discussion of habitat connectivity and fragmentation without 
analyzing the potential impacts . . . on the . . . desert tortoise.”163  This 
finding by the district court clearly indicated that WWP showed a 
likelihood of success on the merits, which should have satisfied the 
merits prong of the “serious questions” test. 
According to both preliminary-injunction tests, WWP made a 
showing that it had a likelihood of success on the merits of its claims, 
and in the least it had raised serious questions.  These findings, having 
satisfied the first prong of both tests, next mandated that the court 
 
160 Id. at 1131–35 (affirming continuing validity of the “sliding-scale” and “serious questions” 
test standards post-Winter, 555 U.S. 7).    
161 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 546 n.12 (1987). 
162 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977; 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (Westlaw 2014). 
163 Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14, W. Watersheds Project v.  
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011), available at 
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf. 
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determine whether, absent a preliminary injunction, WWP would have 
suffered irreparable harm.164  The district court would again incorrectly 
apply the standard. 
2. Irreparable Harm 
In order to obtain a preliminary injunction, the plaintiff must show 
that irreparable harm is likely to occur if equitable relief is not granted.165  
The Supreme Court has long recognized that the destruction of the 
environment is inherently an irreparable injury.166  In fact, the district 
court stated similarly in this case that “[t]he harm to the [tortoise] 
population at the proposed site brought about by the loss of thousands of 
acres of desert habitat is itself a sufficient irreparable injury to warrant 
equitable relief.”167 
Here, without a preliminary injunction the Project would certainly 
have proceeded with construction and destroyed the desert tortoise 
habitat WWP was attempting to protect with its request for equitable 
relief.  Because the habitat would be destroyed absent the court granting 
a preliminary injunction, it followed that WWP would suffer irreparable 
harm.  This fact, along with the Supreme Court’s precedent recognizing 
environmental harms as irreparable injury,168 show that WWP 
demonstrated that without a preliminary injunction it was likely suffer 
irreparable harm. 
The district court, in its erroneous order, found that an injunction 
would not likely prevent any irreparable injury to WWP.169  If it had 
found that irreparable harm was likely absent a preliminary injunction, 
the court would next have been required to balance the equities to 
determine whether a preliminary injunction would be in the public 
interest.170 
 
164 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1135 (9th Cir. 2011). 
165 Id. 
166 See Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545. 
167 Order Re Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 32, W. Watersheds Project v. 
Salazar, Case No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex) (C.D. Cal. 2011) (emphasis added), available at 
www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf.   
168 Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545. 
169 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *72 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
170 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138-39 (weighing, in part, the irreparable 
environmental harm of an action against economic considerations that would be harmed if an 
injunction were granted). 
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3. Balance of Equities and the Public Interest 
The Ninth Circuit has determined that, in deciding whether a 
preliminary injunction would be in the public interest, a court should 
balance equitable considerations, and based on that analysis, determine 
whether a “critical public interest” would be harmed if a preliminary 
injunction were to be granted.171  In this case, the equities the district 
court should have balanced were the irreparable harm that would be done 
to the tortoise and its habitat if it did not grant a preliminary injunction, 
against the public interests that would be harmed by the injunction’s 
delay of the Project until the NEPA violations had been remedied.172 
The district court instead erroneously balanced the irreparable harm 
to the tortoise against the harm an injunction could cause the Project’s 
expected contribution to “state and federal goals for the increased use of 
renewable energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; .  .  .  
BrightSource[‘s expenditure of] more than $712 million constructing the 
project to date; . . . [the Project’s potential] impact upon hundreds of 
workers and state revenues; . . . and [WWP’s delay] bringing its motion 
for a preliminary injunction until after the project was well underway.”173  
This balancing of the equities was erroneous because it incorrectly 
balanced the irreparable harm the Project would cause the tortoise, 
against the harm to public interests that would have been caused if the 
Project were not built at all.  It created a framework for analysis based on 
the false premise that a preliminary injunction would have killed the 
Project.  Preliminary injunctions are not permanent and are intended in 
the context of NEPA to halt environmental destruction only until the 
procedural requirements of NEPA are adhered to,174  so that a fully 
informed decision can be made.175 
If the court had applied the law correctly, it would have balanced 
the irreparable harm the Project would cause the tortoise, against the 
harm to the public interests that would have been caused by the delay of 
construction.  Because a preliminary injunction would be in effect only 
until BLM had cured its EIS’s deficiencies, the delay would not have 
affected “state and federal goals for the increased use of renewable 
 
171 Id. at 1138. 
172 Id. at 1138-39. 
173 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *68-9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
174 S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 728 (9th 
Cir. 2009) (per curiam). 
175 Block, 690 F.2d at 767. 
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energy and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions” or “workers and 
[contribution to] state revenues.”176  The delay would have been 
temporary, and the Project would have moved forward once the EIS was 
adequate under NEPA.  Because construction would have recommenced 
after NEPA violations had been cured, there was virtually no risk of 
causing harm to the state and federal objectives of the Project.  The 
district court expressed concern that a delay could “frustrate” federal and 
state public policies underlying the Project’s funding and financial 
incentives it could qualify for.177  This concern was unwarranted and 
improper, because the delay needed to cure the EIS deficiencies for 
which WWP had meritorious claims (inadequate habitat fragmentation 
and alternatives analyses) would not have been long enough to be fatal to 
the Project’s financing.178  ISEGS would still have received government 
money if its completion timeline had been delayed. 
The district court also erroneously considered BrightSource 
Energy’s potential financial hardship resulting from delay as a balancing 
factor.  The Ninth Circuit has made clear that courts and agencies may 
“not . . . consider the [private] investments made on the basis of a 
defective EIS,” especially when construction moves forward “with full 
awareness of the [plaintiff’s] suit and . . . [proceeding is a] gamble on the 
EIS being [found] adequate.”179  BLM, and by extension BrightSource 
Energy, recognized WWP’s issues with the EIS as early as February 11, 
2010,180 and knew of the lawsuit as of January 14, 2011.181  Despite its 
collective knowledge of the serious concerns raised by WWP, BLM 
issued notices that allowed construction to start on March 2, 2011, and 
BrightSource began the process of installing perimeter fencing around 
the Project site.182  The court’s decision to discuss and emphasize the 
economic loss private investors would suffer due to any delay of the 
Project illustrates its grave error in its balancing-of-the-equities 
 
176 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *67-8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
177 Id. at *62. 
178 See 10 C.F.R. pt. 609 (Westlaw 2014); see also 26 U.S.C.A. § 54C (Westlaw 2014).   
179 N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988).   
180 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-salazar-
gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
181 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 17, at 24. 
182 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *10 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
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analysis.183  This erroneous analysis led the district court to consider the 
public-interest prong of both preliminary injunction tests based on a false 
premise. 
The accepted analysis used to determine whether granting a 
preliminary injunction is in the public interest, as determined by the 
Ninth Circuit, requires a court to consider whether a “critical public 
interest” would be harmed if the preliminary injunction were to be 
granted.184  In this case, that called for measuring the harm to the public 
interest caused if the Project were delayed, against the well-established 
“public interest in preserving nature and avoiding irreparable 
environmental injury.”185  The Ninth Circuit has also recognized that 
suspending a project until environmental concerns are cured “comports 
with the public interest” in many cases.186 
The Supreme Court has similarly accepted that “[e]nvironmental 
injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately remedied by money 
damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., 
irreparable.  If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of 
harms will usually favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the 
environment.”187  With the likelihood of irreparable environmental injury 
certain in this case, a preliminary injunction would have served the 
public interest, delaying the Project only until BLM made its EIS’s 
analysis lawful under NEPA.  A “critical public interest” would not have 
been harmed in this case if a preliminary injunction had been granted; it 
would merely have been delayed.  A delay could certainly have added 
cost to the Project, but private losses incurred because of a deficient EIS 
are not something the court can lawfully consider.188 
The facts in the record illustrated that WWP showed a likelihood of 
success on the merits of its claims, that it would have been irreparably 
harmed if a preliminary injunction were not granted, and that issuing an 
injunction was in the public interest because it would have avoided 
 
183 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *67-8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
184 Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 632 F.3d at 1138. 
185 McNair, 537 F.3d at 1005 (en banc) (discussing Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 
U.S. 531 (1987)), overruled in part on other grounds by Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
555 U.S. 7 (2008). 
 186 S. Fork Band Council of W. Shoshone, 588 F.3d at 728 (per curiam) (“As to the public 
interest, Congress’s determination in enacting NEPA was that the public interest requires careful 
consideration of environmental impacts before major federal projects may go forward. Suspending a 
project until that consideration has occurred thus comports with the public interest.”). 
187 Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545 (emphasis added). 
188 N. Cheyenne Tribe, 851 F.2d at 1157. 
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irreparable injury to the environment without harming the critical public 
interest in developing clean-energy infrastructure.  The district court’s 
decision to deny temporary equitable relief to WWP, despite the record, 
was an abuse of discretion.189 
C. THE NINTH CIRCUIT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DISTRICT COURT’S 
DECISION BECAUSE IT WAS BASED ON A MISTAKE OF LAW AND 
WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
The Ninth Circuit holds that a “district court abuses its discretion 
when its equitable decision is based on an error of law or a clearly 
erroneous factual finding.”190  In this case, the district court made its 
decision to deny equitable relief despite evidence that should have 
compelled it to grant a preliminary injunction.191  The court’s action was 
an abuse of its discretion because the decision was based on its erroneous 
application of NEPA and the two accepted preliminary-injunction tests.  
The Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the district court’s mistake of 
law and abuse of discretion was erroneous. 
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision without 
examining its NEPA analysis and without discussing its application of 
the first two prongs of the Winter test.192  The appellate court’s limited 
discussion of the balancing of the equities factor and the public-interest 
factor of Winter to justify the district court’s decision completely ignored 
the court’s obligation to reverse when an error of law or a clearly 
erroneous factual finding exists.193  If the court had analyzed the district 
court’s NEPA analysis and all prongs of the Winter and the “Serious 
Questions” tests, then it would have reversed the lower court’s decision.  
This leaves the glaring question of why the Ninth Circuit felt it pertinent 
to overlook the flawed judgment of the district court. 
The most illuminating clue to why the Ninth Circuit did not 
determine that the district court’s decision was an abuse of discretion is 
embodied in its commendation of the lower court’s balancing and 
weighing of the equities.194  The opinion focused on the fact that the 
district court properly weighed federal and state goals when determining 
 
189 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977 (“a judgment that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts 
as found”).   
190 United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 642 (9th Cir. 1998). 
191 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977.   
192 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d 921, 923 (9th Cir. 2012). 
193 United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d at 642. 
194 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, 692 F.3d at 923. 
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that injunctive relief was not in the public interest.195  This approbation 
overlooked, however, the fact that the district court only came to that 
conclusion after erroneously evaluating BLM’s EIS analysis and WWP’s 
NEPA claims.196 
Further, the Ninth Circuit failed to consider the district court’s 
puzzling decision to deny preliminary injunctive relief despite the fact 
that it stated in its opinion that WWP “raise[d] a serious question as to 
whether BLM violated NEPA,”197 and that “[t]he harm to the [tortoise] 
population at the proposed site brought about by the loss of thousands of 
acres of desert habitat . . . [was] itself a sufficient irreparable injury to 
warrant equitable relief.”198  This oversight, in combination with Ninth 
Circuit’s deviation from the Supreme Court’s holding that irreparable 
environmental injury typically favors preliminary injunctive relief, only 
further calls into question the court’s motivation to affirm the district 
court’s faulty judgment.199 
It is certainly true that by the time this case was argued before the 
Ninth Circuit the Project was well on its way to completion,200 but to 
paper over obvious errors in the district court’s analysis was 
disingenuous.  The policy considerations the appellate court focused on, 
though an important factor for deliberation, cannot override the evidence 
illustrating that the district court made a mistake of law.201  The Ninth 
Circuit’s emphasis on discussing the importance of building clean-energy 
infrastructure, however agreeable and insightful it may be, did not do 
anything to address the errors the district court’s ruling was based upon.  
The district court abused its discretion by rendering a decision “that 
 
195 Id. (“The district court properly took into account the federal government’s stated goal of 
increasing the supply of renewable energy and addressing the threat posed by climate change, as 
well as California’s argument that the ISEGS project is critical to the state’s goal of reducing fossil 
fuel use, thereby reducing pollution and improving health and energy security in the state.”). 
196 Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir. 1998) 
(“Under this deferential standard, we must defer to an agency’s decision that is ‘fully informed and 
well-considered.’ However, we need not forgive a ‘clear error of judgment.’” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
197 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *25-6 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
198 W. Watersheds Project v. Salazar, No. CV 11-00492 DMG (Ex), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
151556, at *58 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2011), available at www.eswr.com/docs/cts/cacd/wwp-v-
salazar-gee-order-8-11-2011.pdf, aff’d, 692 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 2012). 
199 Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. at 545. 
200 Christian Roselund, Waiting on Ivanpah, CLEAN TECHNIA (Feb. 21, 2014), 
http://cleantechnica.com/2014/02/21/ivanpah-solar-power-plant-isnt-quite-complete/. 
201 United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d at 642. 
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[was] clearly against the logic and effect of the facts as found.”202  The 
Ninth Circuit’s failure to recognize the lower court’s mistakes of law and 
clearly erroneous factual findings sets a bad precedent. 
The reality of the basis for the Ninth Circuit’s decision sits solely 
with the judges involved, but the brevity of the order certainly disguised 
the complexity of the issues raised in this case.  This decision may lead 
to a future in which conservationists have no power to temporarily halt 
projects that have been approved by federal agencies that have not done 
their due diligence.  Projects could be approved without the government 
considering every significant environmental impact, without the public 
being adequately informed of what the proposed actions are, and without 
sufficient evaluation of the environmental consequences and alternatives 
to the actions before proceeding.203  But the importance of building 
clean-energy infrastructure does raise a serious question; should courts 
recognize an exception to NEPA requirements for clean-energy projects 
because of their important role in reducing carbon emissions that 
contribute to climate change and its macro-effect on the environment? 
CONCLUSION 
Yes.  Development designed to use limited natural resources in a 
way that benefits the many over the few without waste is what Gifford 
Pinchot dreamed for the future.204  Large-scale clean-energy projects 
undoubtedly fit into his idea of “conservation” because they give society 
electricity without continuously pumping carbon into the atmosphere.  In 
the face of climate change and in the midst of a stagnating economy, the 
benefits of these projects are immense, and they are something all 
“conservationists” should get behind.  The Ninth Circuit recognized 
these benefits, and its decision certainly helped one of these projects 
steamroll through construction, but it could also help undermine the 
regulatory framework designed to support smart development. 
NEPA was the culmination of the principles set out by Pinchot:205 
regulations designed to make sure that when development occurs, it 
proceeds in the most beneficial manner possible, both for people and the 
natural environment.206  The danger created by the Ninth Circuit’s 
rubber-stamping of the district court’s flawed NEPA analysis is that 
future projects that do not have such great environmental benefits can 
 
202 Rabkin, 350 F.3d at 977. 
203 LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1. 
204 PINCHOT, supra note 3, ch. 1. 
205 Id. 
206 LUTHER, supra note 81, at 1. 
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rely on precedent to thwart requests for preliminary injunctions made by 
conservation groups like WWP. 
The best way to protect the NEPA framework, which has helped 
promote smarter development over the past forty years, is to create 
within it a bright-line exception for clean energy projects to give them 
flexibility to build quickly and efficiently.  Development always has 
environmental consequences, but clean-energy projects differ in one 
important way.  Although they have local detrimental effects, on a global 
scale they help reduce carbon emissions.  If these projects don’t move 
forward quickly, climate change may never be curtailed, and if that 
happens it may be too late for species like gopherus agassizii. 
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